Naïve Realism in Kantian Phrase by Gomes, Anil
  
 
NAÏVE REALISM  IN KANTIAN PHRASE 
Anil Gomes 
Trinity College, University of Oxford 
 
Forthcoming, MIND [accepted 2016] 
 
Early twentieth-century philosophers of perception presented their naïve 
realist views of perceptual experience in anti-Kantian terms. For they took 
naïve realism about perceptual experience to be incompatible with Kant’s 
claims about the way the understanding is necessarily involved in 
perceptual consciousness. This essay seeks to situate a naïve realist account 
of visual experience within a recognisably Kantian framework by arguing 
that a naïve realist account of visual experience is compatible with the 
claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in the perceptual 
experience of those rational beings with discursive intellects. The effect is a 
middle-way between recent conceptualist and non-conceptualist 
interpretations of Kant: one which holds that the understanding is 
necessarily involved in the kind of perceptual consciousness that we, as 
rational beings, enjoy whilst allowing that the relations of apprehension 
which constitute perceptual consciousness are independent of acts of the 
understanding. 
1. Introduction 
Our textbook nativity stories often trace the foundation of analytic 
philosophy back to the rejection of neo-Hegelian idealism in Cambridge at 
the start of the twentieth-century. It is less often appreciated that this 
rejection was also a rejection of Kantian idealism and, in particular, a 
rejection of Kant’s account of the role the mind plays in shaping 
perceptual access to the world. The birth of analytic philosophy in both 
Oxford and Cambridge involved a sustained engagement with Kant’s 
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works and many of those involved in this undertaking – G.E. Moore, John 
Cook Wilson, H.A. Pritchard – rejected Kant’s account of perceptual 
consciousness as incompatible with a straight-forward realism about our 
perceptual access to empirical objects.1 
These Oxford and Cambridge realists instead endorsed a view on which 
perceptual consciousness is constituted by a primitive relation of 
acquaintance or apprehension, one which presents the world to the 
perceiver by way of non-conceptual sensory capacities and without any 
input or intellectual activity from the apprehending mind (Cook Wilson 
1926; Prichard 1909; Moore 1903b; Russell 1910, 1912). They differed, 
at least after some vacillation in Cambridge, as to the second relatum of 
this relation. The Oxford Realists held that this relation of apprehension is 
one that subjects stand in to ordinary empirical objects and their 
properties; the Cambridge Realists – motivated by considerations 
involving illusions and mistaken appearances – recanted this view in 
favour of the claim that it is a relation that subjects stand in to mind-
independent but non-physical sense-data (Moore 1913; Broad 1923; see 
also Martin 2003; Hatfield 2013). 
Let us call the view which remained in Oxford naïve realism. It 
encompasses a tradition in the philosophy of perception which stretches 
from Cook Wilson and Prichard to the recent writings of Mike Martin 
and Charles Travis amongst others. Naïve realist accounts of perceptual 
experience have become central in recent debates about our perceptual 
access to the world (Martin 2002a; Campbell 2002b; Brewer 2011; Travis 
2013). And the claim of these early realists was that naïve realism is 
incompatible with Kant’s views on the nature of perception. 
 
1 The clearest statement of this rejection is in Prichard’s Kant’s Theory of Knowledge 
(Prichard 1909). Both Cook Wilson and Prichard lectured on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
(Prichard 1909, p.iii) and Cook Wilson’s writings (Cook Wilson 1926) contain a number 
of discussions of Kantian themes. Indeed, A.S.L. Farquaharson, in his memoir of Cook 
Wilson, goes so far as to trace the origins of the Oxford strand of early analytic 
philosophy back to questions posed by a student during Cook Wilson’s lectures on Kant 
(Cook Wilson 1926, p.xix). The 1897 and 1898 dissertations which Moore submitted for 
the Trinity College Prize Fellowship examinations (Moore 2011) include sustained 
discussion of Kant’s idealism and mark the start of Moore’s conversion from idealism to 
realism; his ‘Refutation of Idealism’ (1903b) and ‘Kant’s Idealism’ (1903a) – the title of 
the former containing a somewhat ironic allusion to Kant – include a rejection of 
Kantian claims about perception as incompatible with realism. See (Hanna 2001) for 
further discussion of the anti-Kantian character of early analytic philosophy. 
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This may sound like common-sense. After all, we all know that Kant is a 
transcendental idealist – and whatever transcendental idealism is, it doesn’t 
sound very naïve, nor very realist. My aim in this paper is to show that this 
reaction is mistaken. Kant’s account of perception has much in common 
with naïve realism, and the early-twentieth century naïve realist conception 
of visual perception can be incorporated within a recognisably Kantian 
framework. 
Why think that naïve realism is incompatible with Kant’s views on the 
nature of perception? §2 will characterise naïve realism in more detail. For 
now, the following rough characterisation will suffice: naïve realism takes 
visual perceptual consciousness to be constituted by primitive relations of 
apprehension. Subjects can stand in these relations without representing 
the world as being a particular way. The objects of these relations are the 
ordinary empirical objects which populate the world around us. And in 
virtue of standing in these relations, perceptual consciousness presents us 
with the empirical world. 
This account of visual perceptual consciousness has important affinities 
with Kant’s discussion of our perceptual access to objects. I will outline the 
case in more detail in §3 below, but for now note that, according to the 
first Critique, there are two distinct faculties involved in human cognition: 
a passive faculty of sensible reception and an active faculty of the 
understanding (A50/B74). The role of sensibility is to provide us with 
objects; it does this through intuitions [Anschauungen] which relate us 
immediately to the objects of experience. In contrast, the role of the 
understanding is to enable us to think of objects, and it does this through 
the use of concepts [Begriffe] (A19/B33). Both capacities are drawn upon 
in our cognizing the world: ‘without sensibility no object would be given 
to us, without understanding no object would be thought’ (A51/B76). But 
‘these two faculties cannot exchange their functions. The understanding is 
not capable of intuiting anything, and the senses are not capable of 
thinking anything. Only from their unification can cognition arise’ 
(A51/B76). 
This division of our cognitive faculties appears to imply that sensibility 
alone is sufficient for the perceptual presentation of objects in intuition: 
‘objects are given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us 
intuitions’ (A19/B34). And ‘intuition by no mean requires the functions of 
thinking’ (A91/B123); it is given ‘prior to all thinking’ (B132). This 
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suggests that sensibility presents us with objects without any input from 
our conceptual faculties. Although this doesn’t entail a naïve realist account 
of perceptual consciousness, it at least seems compatible with it and the 
potential similarities are intriguing. 
So whence arises the incompatibility? The trouble arises because Kant 
appears to take back this initial characterisation of sensibility – or, at least, 
severely reinterpret it – in the Transcendental Analytic section of the first 
Critique. In contrast with sensibility, the understanding is a faculty for 
judging or thinking (A69/B94); it does this by means of concepts which 
represent what is common to more than one object (A19/B33); and all 
judgements are ‘functions of unity among our representations’ (A69/B94). 
But ‘the same function which gives unity to the various representations in 
a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of representations in an 
intuition’ (A79/B105), and ‘all synthesis, through which even perception 
itself becomes possible, stands under the categories’ (B161). Thus 
perceptual consciousness itself involves acts of synthesis undertaken by the 
understanding and guided by conceptual capacities. And if perceptual 
consciousness involves acts of synthesis undertaken by the understanding, 
then purely sensible relations alone cannot suffice for perceptual 
consciousness, contrary to the tenets of naïve realism. 
The Oxford Realist response to this supposed incompatibility is to reject 
Kant’s theory of perceptual experience. An alternative response is to deny 
that Kant held the understanding to be constitutive of perceptual 
consciousness. According to recent non-conceptualist interpretations of 
Kant (Hanna 2001, 2005; Allais 2009, 2012), Kant denies that the 
application of concepts is necessary for the perceptual presentation of 
outer particulars. One striking motivation for endorsing such a view 
consists in the ascription to Kant of some form of relational or naïve realist 
account of perception. As Allais puts it, ‘although he does not explicitly 
situate his view in terms of the theories of perception we discuss today, 
[Kant] clearly commits himself to a key part of the direct realist or 
relational position’ (2011, p.382). The reasoning follows that of the 
Oxford Realists: if Kant held that sensibility alone suffices for perceptual 
consciousness, he cannot have thought the involvement of conceptual 
capacities necessary for such consciousness. 
These non-conceptualist interpretations make naïve realism compatible 
with Kant by denying that Kant held the understanding to be necessarily 
5 
involved in perceptual consciousness. On this picture, the understanding is 
not involved in ‘the basic capacity to perceive particulars but… [only in] 
the capacity to apply empirical concepts in judgements’ (Allais 2012, 
p.103). Such an account brings Kant’s theory of perceptual experience very 
close to the naïve realism of the Oxford Realists: perceptual consciousness 
presents us with outer particulars without any involvement of the 
understanding. But it does so by denying any necessary involvement of the 
understanding in perceptual consciousness.2 
My aim in this paper to present an alternative way to reconcile naïve 
realism and Kant’s theory of perceptual experience: one which holds, with 
naïve realism, that visual perceptual consciousness is constituted by 
relations of apprehension but claims also that the understanding is 
necessarily involved in the perceptual experience of those rational beings 
with discursive intellects. The effect is a middle-way between the 
conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of Kant: one which 
holds that the understanding is necessarily involved in the kind of 
perceptual consciousness that we, as rational beings, enjoy whilst allowing 
that the relations of apprehension which constitute perceptual 
consciousness are independent of acts of the understanding. 
The title of the paper comes from P.F. Strawson’s 1979 paper, ‘Perception 
and Its Objects’. In that paper, Strawson undertakes to provide a strict 
account of visual experience which in no way ‘distort[s] or misrepresent[s] 
the character of that experience as we actually enjoy it’ (Strawson 1979, 
p.127). The resulting account of our ordinary conception of visual 
experience has been claimed to have affinities with both naïve realism and 
concept-involving accounts of perception.3 And Strawson summarises it in 
the following words: ‘mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself 
as, in Kantian phrase, an immediate consciousness of the existence of 
things outside us’ (p.132). The words ‘in Kantian phrase’ are often excised 
in quotation. But they are my spur in what follows. For they offer the 
promise that a naïve realist account of visual perception can be 
accommodated within a Kantian framework on experience, one which 
 
2 Such views can allow the understanding to be causally relevant in bringing about 
perceptual consciousness. And they can allow occasions on which perceptual 
consciousness is cognitively penetrated by the understanding. But they deny that there is 
anything necessary about such penetration. See §3 below. 
3 See (Crane 2005a, pp.245-257; Nudds 2009, p.334 fn.2) for references to Strawson in 
the context of motivating naïve realism; see (Strawson 1979, p.129) for the claim that 
‘sensible experience is permeated by concepts’; and cf. (Strawson 1992, p.62). 
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takes the understanding to be actively involved in perceptual consciousness 
contrary to both the Oxford realists and the non-conceptualist interpreters 
of Kant. 
I’ll proceed as follows. In §2 I set out a more specific characterisation of 
naïve realism and clarify its supposed tension with Kant’s account of 
perceptual experience. In §3 I provide some reason for thinking both that 
Kant’s account of sensibility can profitably be read on the model of a naïve 
realist account of visual perception and that Kant was committed to the 
involvement of the understanding in perceptual consciousness. In §4 I 
suggest a way in which a Kantian account of experience can make room 
for the naïve realist picture of visual perception by showing how naïve 
realism about visual experience is compatible with the essential 
involvement of the understanding in the perceptual consciousness of 
rational beings.4 And in §5 I consider the relation of this Kantian form of 
naïve realism to Kant’s project in the first Critique. 
The operative term here is Kantian: I do not take myself to show that these 
are Kant’s ways of thinking about the issues. Contemporary ethics 
distinguishes between Kant’s ethics and Kantian ethics (O’Neill 1989, Part 
III; Wood 2008, ch.1.1). Kant’s ethics is ‘the theory that Kant himself put 
forward’ whilst Kantian ethics is ‘an ethical theory formulated in the basic 
spirit of Kant, drawing on and acknowledging a debt to what the author of 
the theory takes to be his insights in moral philosophy’ (Wood 2008, p.1). 
The account of visual experience motivated in this paper is put forward in 
the spirit of a Kantian approach to the philosophy of perception. What I 
hope to provide are some suggestions for how the naïve realist insight can 
be accommodated within a recognisably Kantian framework for thinking 
about the distinction between sensibility and the understanding and the 
involvement of each faculty in perceptual consciousness. 
One caveat before I begin: I will conduct this discussion within a 
framework of empirical realism and put to one side issues about how my 
proposal relates to transcendental idealism. This is not because I think the 
relation unimportant. Rather, I take it that transcendental idealism is 
 
4 I confine myself here to visual perception. Kant draws distinctions between the five 
senses in the Anthropology, in particular distinguishing the objective senses of touch, sight 
and hearing from the subjective senses of taste and smell (An 7:154). These differences 
may be important in thinking about what a Kantian account of each sense would look 
like and I do not want to prejudge that issue here. 
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Kant’s explanation for certain features of our empirical cognitive life and 
thus that we can investigate Kant’s account of how our intellectual 
capacities are active in perceptual consciousness whilst remaining neutral 
on the question of whether this aspect of cognition requires a 
transcendental idealist explanation. 
2. Naïve Realism 
Some definitions. The phenomenal properties of an experience are those in 
virtue of which there is something it is like to have an experience. The 
phenomenal character of an experience consists of its phenomenal 
properties. We type visual experiences by their phenomenal character: two 
visual experiences are of the same fundamental kind if and only if they 
have the same phenomenal character (Soteriou 2005, p.194). Relational 
theories of visual experience are those on which the phenomenal properties 
of the experiences involved in vision essentially involve non-
representational relations of apprehension which subjects stand in to 
objects. Representational theories of visual experience are those on which 
the phenomenal properties of visual experiences essentially involve 
representational properties. The qualifier ‘non-representational’ in the 
definition of relational theories reflects the fact that relational theorists 
take the relations of apprehension involved in visual experience to be 
primitive and not explicable in terms of the perceived object being 
represented as being some particular way (Brewer 2011, p.94; Soteriou 
2011, p.225). 
Some notes. First, this framework characterises theories which aim to give 
an account of the subjective character of visual experiences. Theories 
which don’t aim to give such an account – such as, perhaps, (Burge 2010) 
– are not covered by this framework. Second, certain representational 
theories claim to allow visual experience to possess relational elements in 
virtue of it involving a representational state with singular or de re content 
(Schellenberg 2011): these views sometimes present themselves as being 
both relational and representational. But to the extent that these views take 
the relations involved in visual experiences to be explained in terms of 
representational content, they do not count as relational theories by this 
framework. 
8 
We can use these distinctions to map the three dominant views in the 
philosophy of perception literature.5 Naïve realism is a relational theory of 
visual experience: it holds that a certain class of visual experiences, namely 
those involved in visual perceptions, have a phenomenal character which 
involves relations of apprehension holding between perceivers and 
empirical objects and their features. Sense-datum theories agree with naïve 
realism that the phenomenal properties of the experiences involved in 
visual perception consist of relations of apprehension but deny that the 
relata of these relations are ordinary empirical objects. Intentional theories 
hold that the phenomenal properties of visual experience are 
representational. 
Intentional theories come in two stripes, depending on whether one takes 
it that the representational properties which determine the phenomenal 
character of a visual experience are constrained by the concepts possessed 
by the subject of the experience. Conceptualist intentional theories hold 
that subjects of visual experiences must possess the concepts required to 
specify the content of those representational states which determine the 
phenomenal character of visual experience; non-conceptualist intentional 
theories reject this claim. This terminology should not be confused with 
the use of the terms ‘conceptualism’ and ‘non-conceptualism’ in the Kant 
literature. In what follows I shall use the terms exclusively in the Kantian 
sense and put to one side these versions of intentional theories.6 
Naïve realism is sometimes expressed as the claim that visual perceptions 
have empirical objects and their features as constituents (Martin 2004, 
 
5 See (Martin 2002a), (Crane 2005b) and (Nudds 2009) for characterisations of the debate 
along these lines. 
6 One question about this framework is where to place the account of perception 
defended by John McDowell (1994, 1998). Relational theorists often cite him as a 
proponent of a representational theory of perceptual experience, on grounds that 
McDowell takes perception to have a certain sort of content (Brewer 2007). McDowell 
disputes this characterisation: he takes his view to show that the proper account of the 
relational aspect of perception cannot do without representational notions and thus that 
relational views are compatible with perceptual experience having content (McDowell 
2008a, 2013), albeit content which is ‘intuitional rather than propositional’ (McDowell 
2008b, p.200). This makes it difficult to place McDowell in the above framework. 
McDowell has some characteristics in common with naïve realist relational theories since 
he holds that that ‘[i]f something in one’s surroundings is in view for one, that is a 
relation one stands in to it’ (2013, p.144). But this relational aspect is not primitive since 
he takes visual perception to be, at root, a representational notion, and to be cashed out 
in a distinctive notion of content. I will put McDowell’s account of perception to one 
side in what follows. Since McDowell draws explicitly on Kant in setting out his account 
of perception (2008a, p.262-4), there is no reason to think that his account is in tension 
with Kant’s views on the nature of perceptual consciousness. 
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p.39; Nudds 2009, p.334; Campbell 2002b, p.116). This is accurate so 
long as the notion of constitution is understood to rule out views on which 
visual perception has an object-dependent representational content 
(McDowell 1994; Brewer 1999). On these latter views, empirical objects 
can perhaps be said to constitute visual perception, for they feature in the 
object-dependent representational content which itself constitutes the 
phenomenal character of visual perception. This is not the sense of 
constitution which characterises naïve realism: for the naïve realist, 
empirical objects constitute visual perception through our non-
representationally apprehending them. 
A further distinction. We can distinguish strong and weak forms of each 
theory. Strong representational theories hold that all of the phenomenal 
properties of visual experiences are representational properties. Weak 
representational theories hold that at least some of the phenomenal 
properties of visual experiences are representational properties. Mutatis 
mutandis for relational theories. Some naïve realists explicitly commit 
themselves to strong relational theories (Brewer 2007, p.89) but there are 
no grounds for thinking that all must do so (Soteriou 2011, p.225, 
Phillips 2005). In what follows I will confine myself to strong naïve 
realism since the early twentieth-century realists who took their naïve 
realism to be incompatible with Kant’s account of perceptual 
consciousness were strong naïve realists. But to the extent that the conflict 
between naïve realism and Kant turns on whether there exists a primitive 
relation of apprehension which is independent of the activity of the 
understanding, then the incompatibility claimed by the early twentieth-
century realists will also encompass weak naïve realism even if such views 
hold that there is more to perceptual consciousness than relations of 
apprehension.7 
Why think that naïve realism is incompatible with Kant’s account of the 
involvement of the understanding in perception? The case for 
incompatibility is set out most forcefully by H.A. Pritchard in his 1909 
book Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, written whilst he was a Fellow of Trinity 
College, Oxford. In his survey of English language commentaries on the 
first Critique, W.H. Walsh sums up the book as follows: ‘Kant's Theory of 
Knowledge is… not so much a serious study of Kant as a work using Kant 
 
7 See (Gomes 2014) for an application of this distinction to the debate about Kant’s 
views on perception. 
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as a stalking-horse in an argument for independent philosophical 
conclusions. Yet it remains, for all the crudities of its interpretation and the 
insensitivities of its author, an impressive book.’ (Walsh 1981, p.732). 
Both of these comments seem to me to be accurate: Prichard’s opposition 
to Kant takes place in the service of his own philosophical account of 
perception and knowledge, but the resulting account is one of considerable 
philosophical interest. 
The account of perception and knowledge which Prichard elucidates and 
defends is one firmly situated in the Oxford Realist tradition. The starting 
point is the claim that acts of knowing are, by definition, distinct from the 
things known (Prichard 1909, p.108, p.118). Knowledge must be sharply 
distinguished from judgement, opinion and belief: ‘Knowledge is sui 
generis and therefore a ‘theory’ of it is impossible. Knowledge is simply 
knowledge, and any attempt to state it in terms of something else must 
end in describing something which is not knowledge.’ (p.245). This 
matters for any account of perception because empirical knowledge 
presupposes perception (p.133) and because the perception of 
spatiotemporal particulars puts one in a position to know about them 
(pp.133-135). Perception must therefore be understood as a way of 
apprehending a reality independent of our acts of knowing which thereby 
makes us knowledgeable of it. 
Prichard uses this framework to motivate a naïve realist account of 
perception: perception is the passive faculty by means of which we 
sensorily apprehend individuals which are independent of the act of 
perceiving them (pp.27-30, p.133); it is a non-propositional mode of 
awareness which takes particulars as objects (pp.44-45); it thus differs 
fundamentally from the conceptual apprehension of universals or facts 
(p.28, p.44). Such an account of perception is required, Prichard claims, if 
we are to hold on to the Oxford Realist conception of knowledge. And it is 
this account of perception which forms the basis of Prichard’s opposition 
to Kant.8 
 
8 See (Kalderon 2011), (Kalderon and Travis 2013) and (Hatfield 2013) for recent naïve 
realist readings of Prichard; see also (Marion 2000a) which suggests a similar reading. 
Prichard’s contemporaries focused on this aspect of his view: see, for example, Price’s 
discussion of Prichard’s views on perception in his biographical memoir of Prichard in 
the Proceedings of the British Academy (Price 1947). The Editor has pointed out to me a 
passage in which Prichard distinguishes perception from ‘perception in the full sense’ and 
claims that the latter includes both perception and conception (1909, p.29). This passage 
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At issue is Kant’s notion of synthesis (1909, p.217). Kant introduces 
synthesis as the activity of ‘putting different representations together with 
each other’ (A77/B103); it is a ‘necessary ingredient’ (A120n) in the 
perception of objects because otherwise the manifold of intuition would be 
‘dispersed and separate in the mind’ (A120); without synthesis we would 
have only ‘unruly heaps’ of representations [Vorstellungen] (A121). But ‘the 
same function which gives unity to the various ideas in a judgement also 
gives unity to the mere synthesis of various ideas in an intuition’ (A79-
80/B105-106) and all combination is an act of the understanding (B130; 
see also B137). Thus the perceptual presentation of particulars in intuition 
involves an act of the understanding. 
The nature of this act of the understanding is a delicate issue. Béatrice 
Longuenesse distinguishes ‘two aspects of the activity of understanding’ 
(Longuenesse 1998, p.63): the understanding as rule-giver for the synthesis 
of the manifold in intuition and the understanding as combiner of 
concepts in judgement. Similarly, one might distinguish between acts of 
the understanding which gather representations together in accordance 
with concepts, and those which involve attributing general attributes to 
representations. The details don’t matter for Prichard: on either construal, 
perceptual consciousness constitutively depends on the activity of the 
understanding. And it is this which Prichard takes to be incompatible with 
naïve realism. 
Why is the constitutive claim incompatible with naïve realism? For 
Prichard, the constitutive claim entails that knowledge ‘consists in an 
activity of the mind by which it combines the manifold of sense on certain 
principles… and by which it thereby gives the manifold relation to an 
object’ (p.230); knowledge-enabling perceptual consciousness thus 
depends on an act of combination undertaken by ‘the productive faculty of 
the imagination, which, in combining the data into a sensuous image, 
gives them the unity desired (p.225). But according to naïve realism ‘the 
 
might suggest that Prichard endorses only a weak form of naïve realism since it appears 
to allow two elements to perceptual consciousness: a primitive relation of apprehension 
and the conceptual representation of the object perceived. But Prichard does not return 
to the notion of ‘perception in the full sense’ in his writings, and his extensive discussion 
of the problem of illusory experiences does not make use of any conceptual element to 
perceptual consciousness in providing an account of illusory experiences. For these 
reasons, I take Prichard’s basic notion of perception to capture perceptual consciousness 
proper. His discussion of perception in the full sense seems like an attempt to capture the 
fact that there is an intentional use of verbs of sense-perception (as Anscombe (1965) 
was later to point out). Thanks to the Editor for helpful discussion of Prichard’s views. 
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act of combination cannot confer upon [sense-elements] or introduce into 
them a unity which they do not already possess’ (p.226). The views thus 
disagree about whether perceptual consciousness relates us immediately to 
objects without any activity of the understanding. Prichard takes his naïve 
realism to stand opposed to Kant in renouncing any need for 
combinatorial activity on the part of the mind to relate us to objects: 
objects are given to us through primitive, non-conceptual, relations of 
apprehension.9 
This criticism is sometimes thought to rely on Prichard’s phenomenalist 
reading of Kant (e.g., (Bird 1962, pp.2-17)) but the opposition cuts 
deeper. It turns on a tension, as Prichard sees it, between the idea of 
perception as a non-conceptual taking in of empirical particulars and the 
Kantian claim that perceptual consciousness depends on acts of the 
understanding. For the naïve realist, the character of our experience is 
determined solely by a primitive relation of apprehension which holds 
between subject and empirical particular. For Kant, perceptual experience 
involves a process of synthesis in which sensory elements are combined 
together in accordance with categorial concepts. These claims pull in 
opposite directions: on one account, perception gets its character from our 
sensory capacity to apprehend objects; on the other, it arises from the 
intellectual activity of combining sensory elements in accordance with 
concepts. Prichard’s claim is that it cannot be both. Something has to give. 
The same thought finds expression in some contemporary expressions of 
strong naïve realism. Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and William Fish each 
oppose their form of naïve realism to any view on which experience has 
representational content on the grounds that phenomenal character is 
determined by the empirical objects perceived and not by any intellectual 
activity of the subject (Brewer 2011; Travis 2013b; Fish 2009). Mark 
Kalderon makes the opposition explicit: his Prichard-influenced form of 
naïve realism is presented in opposition to Kant’s claims about the role of 
synthesis in perception (Kalderon 2011, pp.235-6). As in Oxford Realism, 
 
9 See (Prichard 1909, ch.9) for the full development of this argument. (Brewer 2006, 
p.174f) expresses a related line of thought. (Kalderon 2011, p.236f) and (Travis 2013b) 
discuss Prichard’s argument. Prichard’s discussion encompasses a number of other issues, 
including, for example, the question of how to account for the unity of the objects of 
perceptual consciousness (pp.224-6); the perceptibility of general features of objects 
(pp.226-7); and the grounds for synthesis (pp.214-7). On some of these topics, Prichard’s 
disagreement with Kant may turn on issues distinct from the question of whether the 
understanding is constitutively involved in perceptual consciousness. Thanks to a referee 
for emphasising this point. 
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the claim that perceptual consciousness is constituted by primitive 
relations of apprehension is said to be incompatible with the thought that 
perceptual consciousness constitutively depends on acts of the 
understanding. 
The response of the Oxford Realists is to reject Kant. But if there are 
grounds for thinking that Kant’s account of sensibility has naïve realist 
relational elements, then something more need be said. In the next section 
I will provide a brief overview of the reasons for thinking that Kant’s 
account of sensibility can profitably be read on the model of a naïve realist 
account of visual perception. This leaves the Kantian with a question of 
how to make compatible naïve realism and Kant’s account of the role the 
understanding plays in perceptual consciousness. 
3. Sensibility & The Understanding 
Sensibility 
Lucy Allais notes that interpretations of Kant ‘have gone down many of 
the same roads as have philosophical accounts of perception’ (Allais 2007, 
p.465) – to which one might add the clause ‘a full decade later’.10 Kant’s 
account of sensibility has been read on the model of sense-datum theories 
of perceptual experience (Broad 1978; Strawson 1966); conceptualist 
intentional theories of perceptual experience (McDowell 1998; Abela 
2002); and non-conceptualist intentional theories (Hanna 2005, 2008). 
Allais’s own work – despite its reference to contemporary non-conceptual 
theories (Allais 2009, p.386) – is best read as completing the taxonomical 
space by providing support for a naïve realist interpretation of Kant: (Allais 
2009, p.394; 2010, p.60; 2011, pp.379-383; see also McLear forthcoming 
a). 
What grounds are there for explicating a naïve realist account of visual 
experience in Kantian phrase? Although the physical sensory capacities of 
human beings receive little attention in the first Critique, Kant makes clear 
in the Anthropology that the five senses are forms of outer sense (7:153), 
and that vision, in particular, is a form of objective empirical intuition 
(7:154). Outer sense is a mode of sensibility by which we are presented 
with objects external to the subject (A22/B37) and, as a form of outer 
 
10 Given that Mike Martin’s ‘The Transparency of Experience’ and John Campbell’s 
Reference and Consciousness were both published in 2002, this paper continues the trend. 
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sense, the objects of visual experience are presented to us as situated in 
space (A22/B37) and distinct from ourselves (An 7:156). More generally, 
outer sense is a mode of our capacity ‘to acquire representations 
[Vorstellungen] through the way in which we are affected by objects’ 
(A19/B33) and it does this by means of intuitions [Anschauungen] which 
relate us immediately to the objects of experience (A19/B34). Are there 
any reasons to think that this account of sensibility involves naïve realist 
commitments?11 
An immediate obstacle to any naïve realist interpretation of Kantian 
sensibility is the frequency with which the term ‘Vorstellung’ and its plural 
‘Vorstellungen’ feature in the first Critique. Both Guyer and Wood and 
Kemp-Smith translate ‘Vorstellung’ as ‘representation’, and Kant explicitly 
identifies perception as a form of Vorstellung in the so-called stepladder 
(Stufenleiter) passage at the start of the Transcendental Dialectic 
(A320/B376-7). If perception is a form of Vorstellung, and ‘Vorstellung’ is 
to be translated as ‘representation’, then it would seem that Kant endorsed 
some form of representational or intentional theory of perception. 
The translation of ‘Vorstellung’ as ‘representation’ is often justified on the 
grounds that Kant uses the Latin term ‘repraesentatio’ in a parenthetical 
aside which seems designed to explicate the term (A320/B376). But the 
literal translation of ‘Vorstellung’ is a putting (stellung) before (Vor), and 
Werner Pluhar’s recent translation prefers the term ‘presentation’, as did 
Wolfgang Schwarz in his 1982 concise version (Schwarz 1982) and C.D. 
Broad in his Cambridge lectures (Broad 1978). More generally there are 
strong hermeneutical grounds for thinking that Kant’s use of the term 
‘Vorstellung’ doesn’t commit him to thinking of perception as 
representational in the way in which such a claim is understood by 
intentional theories of perceptual experience. 
 
11 Note that we need to distinguish Kant’s use of the term ‘experience’ [Erfahrung] from 
our contemporary use (see (McLear forthcoming b, §1) and the next section, below). 
Kant is clear that Erfahrung involves a process of conceptual synthesis and as such is 
determined by the concepts a subject possesses (B218-9). This would seem to rule out a 
naïve realist reading of Erfahrung. But Erfahrung is a ‘a kind of cognition requiring the 
understanding’ (Bxvii) and Kant often uses the term to pick out a kind of perceptual 
judgement rather than a perceptual experiential state (e.g., B166, A176/B218, 
A189/B234). Since Kant is explicit that visual perception is a form of objective empirical 
intuition (An 7:154; cf. Prol. 4:283; Prol. 4:283; A180/B222), the question to be pursued 
here is whether the sensory consciousness involved in outer intuition [Anschauung] can be 
understood on naïve realist lines and Kant’s claims concerning the way in which Erfahrung 
is determined by a subject’s concepts don’t settle that issue. Thanks to a referee for 
raising this issue. 
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Let me highlight two issues. The first concerns sensations [Empfindungen]. 
Kant defines a sensation as ‘the effect of an object on the capacity for 
representation, insofar as we are affected by it’ (A19/B34), and gives as 
examples taste and colour, ‘effects accidentally added by the particular 
constitution of the sense organs’ as Kemp Smith has it (A28). And, at least 
with regards to his account of sensation in the first Critique, the dominant 
view has it that Kant took sensations to be non-intentional states: mere 
modifications of sensory consciousness which do not represent states of 
affairs.12 Yet in the stepladder passage, Kant places sensation under the 
genus Vorstellung: a sensation is a Vorstellung with consciousness which 
relates solely to a subject as a modification of its state (A320/B376). If 
these views are right that sensations are non-intentional states, then Kant’s 
use of the term ‘Vorstellung’ cannot commit him to our contemporary 
notion of representation. 
The second issue concerns our understanding of the history of Kant 
interpretation. It’s unsurprising that Broad uses the term ‘presentation’ to 
translate ‘Vorstellung’ favouring, as he does, a sense-datum interpretation of 
Kant (Broad 1978, pp.18-19). For if the term ‘Vorstellung’ were to commit 
Kant to an intentional theory of perception, a relational reading of 
Kantian experience would be ruled out by fiat – and sense-datum theories 
are versions of a relational theory. This is sometimes missed by those who 
treat naïve realism as if it were the only form a relational theory can take. 
And though there is much to object to in sense-datum interpretations of 
Kant, it is surely too much to hope that their falsity be shown simply by 
Kant’s use of the term ‘Vorstellung’. Charity towards our predecessors 
requires that we invoke an understanding of Vorstellung which doesn’t 
settle the issue of whether Kant endorsed a representational or relational 
theory of perception. The prevalence of ‘Vorstellung’ and ‘Vorstellungen’ in 
the Critique shouldn’t tell against a naïve realist account of Kantian 
sensibility. 
Are there any positive reasons for endorsing such a reading? In the rest of 
this section I will mention four reasons for thinking that Kant’s account of 
outer sense can profitably be read on the model of a naïve realist account 
of perceptual experience and that it is therefore appropriate to explicate a 
naïve realist account of visual experience in Kantian phrase. These reasons 
 
12 (George 1981; Westphal 2004, p.44; Hanna 2005, p.254); see (Dickerson 2003, p.24) 
for an opposing view. 
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are not decisive: it would take more space than I have available to make 
the case in detail.13 But I suspect that the strongest consideration against a 
naïve realist interpretation of Kant is the thought that naïve realism 
conflicts with Kant’s claim that the understanding is involved in perceptual 
consciousness. To this extent, the wider argument of this paper is intended 
to buttress the considerations appealed to in this section. 
(1) Accuracy conditions: the standard way to explicate what is involved in 
visual experience possessing representational content is via the notion of an 
accuracy condition (Tye 2009, p.252; Siegel 2010; see also Searle 1983, 
p.43; Peacocke 1983, p.5). Visual experiences are representational because 
they possess conditions which specify ways the world must be in order for 
the representational content of the experience to be true. Thus if Kant 
endorsed some form of a representational theory of perception, he would 
be committed to thinking of perceptual experiences as assessable for truth 
and falsity. 
Yet according to the account of error Kant sets out at the start of the 
Transcendental Dialectic, the deliverances of the senses do not themselves 
admit of truth or falsity: ‘It is correctly said that the senses do not err; yet 
not because they always judge correctly, but because they do not judge at 
all’ (A293). The possibility of error enters only with judgement: it is when 
one judges that things are thus and so that one takes a stand assessable for 
truth and falsity. But ‘[i]n a representation of sense (because it contains no 
judgement at all) there is no error.’ (A294/ B350). This diagnosis is 
repeated in the Logic lectures: ‘Truth and error are found… only in 
judgements’ (BL 24:83; see also JL 9:53, VL 24:825). If the deliverances of 
the senses do not admit of truth or falsity, they cannot set accuracy 
conditions in the manner required by representational theories of 
perception.14 
One response to this line of thought is to distinguish accuracy conditions 
from truth-conditions. One might hold, for example, that only 
conceptually structured content can be truth-apt whereas non-conceptual 
content can be assessed for accuracy without possessing truth conditions. 
 
13 (McLear forthcoming a) provides a detailed defence of the ascription to Kant of a form 
of naïve realism on which perceptual consciousness involves being immediately 
acquainted with aspects of the mind-independent environment. 
14 (McLear forthcoming a, §4.1) develops this line of thought as an argument against 
ascribing to Kant any form of representational theory. 
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And if this is right, then Kant’s claim that the deliverances of the senses 
lack truth conditions is compatible with the claim that they possess 
accuracy conditions, when accuracy conditions are understood in this 
weaker way. 
The problem with this suggestion is that Kant states, in the passages 
quoted above, that illusion and error are found only in judgements 
(A293/B350). And it is hard to see why he would say this if he thought 
that intuitions had representational content which could be assessed for 
accuracy. Those who do distinguish accuracy conditions from truth 
conditions do so because they think that the former can explain illusion 
and misrepresentation without adverting to the type of conceptually 
structured content they take to be essential to the latter. Kant’s insistence 
that illusion is to be found only in judgement makes it implausible that he 
thought the deliverances of the senses were accessible for accuracy if not 
truth.15 
(2) Generality: the link between representational content and accuracy 
conditions holds because states with representational content represent 
things as being a certain way (Crane 1992, p.139).  Bill Brewer has argued 
that to represent a particular as being a certain way is to relate that 
particular to a general condition that must be met in order for the content 
of the representation to be true (Brewer 2006, pp.172-4). Generality is 
thus ‘essentially involved in the notion of perceptual content’ (Brewer 
2006, p.172). This is clearest in the case of the thought that a is F: ‘Here, a 
particular object, a, is thought to be a specific general way, F, which such 
objects may be and which infinitely many qualitatively distinct objects are’ 
(Brewer 2006, p.173). But it also holds, Brewer claims, for representations 
with singular or doubly demonstrative content, such as the representation 
‘that man is thus’. Such representations ‘again represent a particular thing 
as being a determinate general way, which, again, infinitely many 
qualitatively distinct possible objects are.’ (2006, p.173). 
What does Brewer mean in claiming that representational content 
essentially involves generality? I take the thought to be something like the 
following: all representational content – whether singular or general – 
 
15 Note also that there is no evidence that Kant anywhere endorses the claim that 
intuitions are assessable for accuracy, so there is a burden on a representational theorist 
who wants to make this move to provide a positive reason for reading Kant in this way. 
Thanks to a referee for making this point. 
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involves specification; it requires a selection from amongst the ways the 
world could be in order to fix the way which determines the truth 
conditions for the representational state. This is true even if the selection 
involves demonstrative terms and is so incompatible with the falsity of 
what is selected. Consider Brewer’s example of perceiving a red ball. In this 
case, the colour and shape are selected as relevant from a set of parameters 
including the ball’s weight, shape and cost. And within the selected 
parameters of colour and shape, some unique value for its colour and 
shape are selected as setting the correctness conditions on the experience. 
Any variation from these unique settings results in the experience being 
inaccurate. This selection – this singling out – showcases a kind of 
generality essentially tied to representational content: all content involves 
the selection and categorisation of determinate general conditions which 
specify a way the world must be in order for the content of the experience 
to be true.16 
This feature of representational content is hard to square with Kant’s 
insistence on the particularity of intuitions and his contrast with the 
universality or generality of concepts (A19/B33; A68/B93; A320/B376-7; 
JL 9:91). It is concepts which represent ‘what is common to several objects’ 
(JL 9:91) whereas intuitions singularly and immediately relate us to 
particular objects without a detour through general marks common to all 
such objects (A19/B33). Sebastian Gardner speaks for many when he 
claims that ‘[t]he distinction of intuition and concept thus corresponds to 
the distinction between the particular and the general’ (Gardner 1999, 
p.66; cf. Strawson 1966, pp.20-21). Thus if outer sense proceeds by means 
of Vorstellungen which lack generality – and if Brewer is right to think that 
representational theories of perception are committed to perceptual 
experiences possessing such generality – then outer sense cannot be 
modelled on representational theories of perception.17 
 
16 Charles Travis also links the notions of representational content and generality. See the 
Introduction to his (2013a) and many of the essays therein. 
17 Can this worry be avoided by arguing that Brewer’s notion of generality is wider than 
Kant’s, such that Kant’s insistence on the particularity of intuitions is compatible with 
their involving generality in Brewer’s sense? One might argue that since Kant didn’t 
recognise the existence of singular concepts (JL 9:91), the particularity of intuitions is 
compatible with them involving the generality associated with singular representational 
content. But Kant’s denial of the existence of singular concepts occurs in the context of 
his drawing a distinction between the way in which intuitions and concepts relate us to 
objects, and one way to put the points of Brewer and Travis is that singular content 
relates us to objects in much the same way as general content, through the setting of 
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(3) The object-dependence of intuition: outer sense proceeds by means of 
intuitions, the defining characteristics of which are immediacy and 
singularity (A19/B33, A68/B93, A320/B377, JL 9:91, VL 24:905). Kant 
tells us in the Prolegomena that ‘an intuition is a representation of the sort 
which would depend immediately on the presence of an object 
[Anschauung ist eine Vorstellung, so wie sie unmittelbar von der Gegenwart des 
Gegenstandes abhängen würde].’ (Prol. 4:281) and later in the second-
edition of the Critique that an intuition ‘is dependent on the existence of 
the object’ (B72). As Allais puts it, ‘a clear and straightforward way of 
understanding [this claim]… is to see intuitions as representations which 
essentially involve the presence to consciousness of the particular things 
they represent.’ (Allais 2010, p.59). On this reading, intuitions are object-
dependent relations which require the presence of the object intuited.18 
If this reading is to be rendered plausible, some explanation must be given 
of those passages in which Kant appears to allow the possibility of intuitive 
representations in the absence of the objects perceived.19 But, alongside 
textual exegesis, defenders of this approach typically offer us further 
structural reasons for taking intuitions to be object-dependent states. Allais 
argues that the object-dependence of intuitions is required to make sense 
of Kant’s argument for transcendental idealism in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic (Allais 2010) and that the object-dependence of intuition plays a 
crucial role in Kant’s account of mathematics (Allais 2010, pp.61-62). 
Robert Hanna takes object-dependence as essential to any understanding 
Kant’s account of the synthetic (Hanna 2001, ch.4).  Let me add a further 
consideration. 
In the B-Preface, Kant draws a distinction between cognition and thought. 
We can have cognition of an object ‘only insofar as it is an object of 
sensible intuition’ (Bxxvi; cf. B166) whereas our thoughts ‘have an 
unbounded field’ (B166). That is to say, cognition of objects requires 
intuitions; thought about objects does not. Compare this to the 
characterisation of cognition and thought offered in the footnote at Bxxvi: 
 
determinate general conditions. See (Travis 2013a) on the substantive issue and 
(Thompson 1972; Land 2013) for the case against treating Kantian intuitions as singular 
terms. 
18 See also (Hanna 2001, pp.209-210); cf. (Stephenson 2015) for an opposing view. 
19 For example, (B278-9, An 7:153; 7:167); see (Stephenson 2015) for other relevant 
passages. One option in accounting for these passages is to claim that they show only 
that inner intuitions are not object-dependent. See (McLear 2014, §6) for a version of this 
suggestion. 
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To cognize an object, it is required that I be able to prove its possibility 
(whether by the testimony of experience from its actuality or a priori 
through reason). But I can think whatever I like, as long as I do not 
contradict myself, i.e., as long as my concept is a possible thought, even 
if I cannot give assurance whether or not there is a corresponding 
object somewhere within the sum total of all possibilities. (Bxxvi) 
Here the claim is that cognition of objects requires being able to prove the 
possibility of the object in question; thought about objects does not. 
How do these two characterisations of the distinction between cognition 
and thought relate to one another? Kant seems to think that cognition 
requires sensible intuition because intuition enables subjects to prove the 
possibility of the objects intuited. But why should he think that? The 
object-dependence of intuition provides a straightforward answer: 
intuitions allow us to prove the possibility of objects because such 
intuitions are not possible in the absence of the object perceived. When a 
subject intuits a particular object she stands in a relation which requires 
the presence of that very object: it is for this reason that intuition enables 
you to prove an object’s possibility. Taking intuitions to be object-
dependent states explains and illuminates Kant’s account of the distinction 
between cognition and thought.20 
Such object-dependence can be easily modelled on a naïve realist relational 
account of perception. According to such accounts, the objects of 
perception feature as constituents of a subject’s perceptual experiences. It 
follows from this claim that perceptual experiences are object-dependent: 
having an experience of this kind requires the presence of the object 
perceived. A naïve realist account of outer sense which takes intuitions to 
be relations to objects captures the object-dependence of Kantian 
intuitions. 
As is stands, this consideration is compatible with a representational theory 
of perceptual experience which takes the content of perceptual experience 
to be object-dependent. But note that it doesn’t follow from the fact that 
the content of a state is object-dependent that the state itself is object-
dependent (Martin 2002b) so more would need to be said about how the 
object-dependence of the content of experience secures the object-
 
20 See (Gomes and Stephenson forthcoming) for further discussion of the relation 
between the object-dependence of intuitions and the possibility of cognizing objects. 
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dependence of intuitions themselves. More importantly, Kant is clear that, 
in the case of thought, the fact that the content of a thought is non-
contradictory does not suffice to show that its content is really possible 
(Bxxxvi). The onus is thus on the representational theorist to explain how 
placing object-dependent content within perceptual experience suffices to 
show that the content of that experience is really possible. For if the non-
contradictory content of a thought is insufficient to prove its possibility, it 
is unclear how making that content part of a perceptual state serves to 
make it sufficient. 
(4) The Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism: the Kantian 
phrase with which Strawson summarises his account of visual experience 
alludes to Kant’s claim in the Refutation of Idealism that ‘the 
consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate 
consciousness of the existence of other things outside me [das Bewußtsein 
meines eigenen Daseins ist zugleich ein unmittelbares Bewußtsein des Daseins 
anderer Dinge außer mir]’ (B276). Kant’s target in the Refutation is the 
‘problematic idealism’ of Descartes, a topic which was originally covered in 
the A-Edition of the Fourth Paralogism. And there is much in both 
sections which lends support to a naïve realist account of Kantian 
sensibility. 
Consider first the details of Kant’s attack on problematic idealism. Kant’s 
charge in these passages is that problematic idealism leaves the existence of 
material objects open to question since it requires one to infer the 
existence of material objects as the cause of representations which lie 
within us (A368-372; B276). This complaint has both epistemological and 
cognitive dimensions. Epistemological because such idealism leaves the 
existence of material objects ‘far from certain’ (A372) and thus unknown; 
cognitive because the inference from effect to cause leaves it ‘absolutely 
impossible to comprehend how we are to acquire cognition [Erkenntnis] of 
their reality outside us’ (A378). In both cases, the causal story by means of 
which problematic idealism aims to explain our cognitive contact with the 
world is claimed to be lacking. 
This charge reappears in the naïve realism literature. John Campbell writes 
of views which take the relation between perceptual experiences and 
empirical objects to be purely causal: ‘How can effects provide you, the 
subject, with any conception of what their causes are like?’ (Campbell 
2002a, p.132; cf. Child 1994, pp.147-149). Campbell’s target here is not 
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only sense-datum models of perceptual experience, but also 
representational theories which hold that material objects causally 
determine the representational content of experience (Campbell 2002a, 
pp.132-133). The thought is that such theories leave us cognitively 
isolated from the world precisely because they involve a ‘conception of 
conscious experience as something that is merely an effect of external 
objects’ (Campbell 2002a, p.133).  That is, they assume ‘that the only 
immediate experience is inner experience, and that from that outer things 
could only be inferred…’ (B276).21 
Campbell uses this argument to motivate a naïve realist relational account 
of perception. On a naïve realist view, ‘[w]e have to regard experience of 
the object as reaching all the way to the object itself ’: only so can we allow 
conscious experience a role in explaining our ability to think and know 
about material objects (Campbell 2002a, p.143). Similarly, Kant takes the 
upshot of his argument against problematic idealism to be a view of 
perceptual experience on which ‘outer experience is really immediate’ 
(B276), one which ‘grants to matter, as appearance, a reality which need 
not be inferred but is immediately perceived’ (A371). It is only by thinking 
of perceptual experience as reaching out to the particulars in our 
environment that we can ‘prove the existence of objects in space outside 
me’ (B275). The Refutation of Idealism supports a naïve realist reading of 
outer sense. 
These four considerations, taken together, do not force upon us a 
relational reading of Kantian sensibility, but it is not obvious that we 
should expect Kant’s texts to be unequivocal in this way. Instead we should 
note how these aspects of Kant’s account of sensibility can be easily 
accommodated within a relational framework. I take this to provide some 
support for the explication of a naïve realist account of visual experience in 
Kantian phrase.22 
 
21 See (Gomes 2013) for more on the relation between this aspect of naïve realism and 
Kant. Cook Wilson makes a similar point in his 1904 letter to G.F. Stout: (Cook Wilson 
1926, pp.769-773). 
22 Is the naïve realist reading of Kantian sensibility in tension with Kant’s scientific 
realism? Kant draws a distinction between the empirical thing-in-itself and the empirical 
appearance at A45-6/B62-3, and it is natural to read this as a form of the primary/ 
secondary quality distinction. More generally, for Kant, the properties that the empirical 
thing-in-itself really possesses are those which science ascribes to it – roughly, force and 
motion – whereas the properties possessed by the empirical appearance are dependent, in 
some way, on human perceivers and their sense organs. Does this mean that empirical 
23 
Understanding 
What are our options? I’ve set out the Oxford Realist case for thinking that 
naïve realism is incompatible with the claim that acts of the understanding 
are constitutive of perceptual consciousness. And I’ve set out the reasons 
for thinking that Kant’s account of sensibility has naïve realist elements. 
One way to resolve this tension is to deny that Kant thought the 
understanding constitutive of perceptual consciousness. There are two 
ways one might do so. First, one might deny that the understanding is 
constitutive of perceptual consciousness but hold that Kant took it to be 
necessarily involved in a certain sort of perceptual consciousness, namely 
that enjoyed by rational beings with discursive intellects. Second, one 
might take the stronger line that the understanding is not constitutive of 
perceptual consciousness nor even necessarily involved in the perceptual 
consciousness of rational beings with discursive intellects. It is important 
to recognise that these are two different ways of denying the constitutive 
claim; the understanding may be necessarily involved in the perceptual 
consciousness of rational beings without being constitutive of it. 
This gives us three options when thinking about the role of the 
understanding in perceptual consciousness: acts of the understanding are 
constitutive of perceptual consciousness; acts of the understanding are 
necessarily involved in the perceptual consciousness of rational beings but 
not constitutive of perceptual consciousness; the understanding is not 
constitutive of perceptual consciousness nor necessarily involved in the 
perceptual consciousness of rational beings. Call these the strong, 
intermediate and weak claims respectively.23 
 
objects don’t have the qualities that we naïvely attribute to them, contrary to naïve 
realism? First, note that naïve realism can allow that ‘the idiosyncracies of the perceiver 
may affect phenomenal content’ (Campbell 2002b, p.119) since perceptual consciousness 
is constituted by relations, and the nature of both relata can affect the nature of the 
perceptual relation. And second, naïve realism is incompatible with scientitifc realism 
only if it follows from scientific realism that the things we ordinarily take ourselves to be 
related to don’t actually exist – that the world is nothing more than force and motion. 
And there is no reason to think that Kant’s distinction between the empirical thing-in-
itself and empirical appearance commits him to thinking of the empirical appearance as 
less than empirically real. See (Langton 1998, ch.7) for a careful discussion of Kant’s 
scientific realism, and (Hanna 2006, ch.4) for an argument that this scientific realism 
doesn’t entail the idealism of manifest objects and their qualities. Thanks to a referee for 
raising this issue. 
23 Defenders of the weak claim can allow that there are some cases in which acts of the 
understanding cognitively penetrate perceptual consciousness. One example might be the 
kinds of perceptual experiences involved when subjects with sophisticated conceptual 
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Recent non-conceptualist interpretations of Kant defend the weak claim. 
According to non-conceptualist readings, Kant’s view is that we can be 
perceptually presented with particulars without any input from the active 
faculty of the understanding (Allais 2009, 2012; Hanna 2001, 2005; 
McLear forthcoming a). Since Kant introduces the understanding as ‘a 
faculty for judging’ and tells us that all judgement proceeds via concepts 
(A69/B94), this is often expressed as the claim that one can be perceptually 
presented with particulars without the application of concepts. Non-
conceptualist readings hold that ‘for Kant, the application of concepts is 
not necessary for our being perceptually presented with outer particulars’ 
(Allais 2009, p.394). 
Such readings can be used to eschew any felt tension between Kant’s 
theory of cognition and a naïve realist account of visual experience. For if 
Kant thinks that we can be visually presented with an outer particular 
without applying any concepts, then there is no obstacle to our conceiving 
of such visual presentation as consisting in a relation of apprehension 
holding between subject and perceived particular. By denying that the 
understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual consciousness, non-
conceptualism opens up the space for a Kantian form of naïve realism. 
Lucy Allais (2009, 2012) motivates the link between non-conceptualism 
and relational theories of perception in just this way. 
Some conceptualist interpretations adopt the strong claim. Griffith, for 
example, claims that, for Kant, ‘perception depends on empirical synthesis, 
which depends on a transcendental synthesis according to the categories’ 
(2010, p.22), where this dependence is to be understood as 
‘(conceptual/transcendental) dependence or grounding’ (p.20). It is claims 
of this sort which the Oxford Realists took to be incompatible with naïve 
realism and ascribing such a view to Kant is in tension with the thought 
that his account of sensibility involves naïve realist elements. 
 
repertoires engage with certain works of art. This means that there are a spectrum of 
views one can hold, with the intermediate claim that the understanding is necessarily 
involved in, though not constitutive of, the perceptual consciousness of rational beings 
lying at one end, and the view that the understanding is not involved in perceptual 
consciousness at all lying at the other. Extant weak views seem to fall towards the latter 
extreme. Both Allais and Hanna make much of the fact that the understanding is 
involved only in the capacity to think about empirical objects (Allais 2012, pp.103-106) 
and make objectively valid judgements (Hanna 2013), and neither discusses any cases in 
which the understanding penetrates perceptual consciousness. But one could endorse a 
weak view which allowed some cases of penetration. Thanks to a referee for discussion. 
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The intermediate claim falls in between the standard characterisations of 
conceptualism and non-conceptualism in the Kant literature. Hannah 
Ginsborg, for instance, defends conceptualism by arguing that ‘Kant is 
committed to a view on which perceptual synthesis involves the exercise of 
understanding’ (2007, p.11) – a claim which is neutral between the 
intermediate and strong formulations. On the intermediate view, the 
understanding is necessarily involved in the perceptual consciousness of 
rational beings but it is not constitutive of perceptual consciousness. This 
is a non-conceptualist position, in so far as it denies that the 
understanding is constitutive of perceptual consciousness. But it is a 
conceptualist position, in so far as it takes the role of the understanding, in 
discursive beings, to extend beyond mere thought about objects into all 
instances of perception. 
The Oxford Realists claim that naïve realism is incompatible with the 
strong claim. But they take it to follow from this that the understanding is 
not involved in perceptual consciousness at all. Similarly, non-
conceptualist readings that ascribe a form of naïve realism to Kant deny 
that the understanding is necessarily involved in the perceptual 
consciousness of discursive beings. The availability of the intermediate 
reading suggests a middle position. It may be possible to defend a Kantian 
form a naïve realism on which the understanding is necessarily involved in 
discursive perceptual consciousness without being constitutive of 
perceptual consciousness. This would make naïve realism compatible with 
Kant’s claims about the role of the understanding in perceptual 
consciousness without endorsing the weak reading. It is an intermediate 
position of this sort that I offer below.24 
Before I do so, it will be useful to consider some of the reasons for 
rejecting the weak reading. We can think of the debate between the strong 
and intermediate views on one side, and the weak view on the other, as a 
dispute about where best to limn the domain of the understanding. Strong 
and intermediate readings hold that the understanding reaches out to 
 
24 McDowell may seem to offer us an intermediate position of this sort, for although he 
takes the understanding to be constitutive of perceptual consciousness, he is clear that he 
means it to be constitutive of our perceptual consciousness, allowing that there might be 
other forms of perceptual consciousness which stand to our form of perceptual 
consciousness as a different species of the same genus (McDowell 2011, pp.20-21, pp.54-
57). Matt Boyle (2012) provides a helpful framework for thinking about this kind of 
position. I comment on the relation between my proposal and that of McDowell and 
Boyle below. 
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perception itself: the understanding is necessarily involved in the 
perceptual consciousness of discursive beings. Weak readings deny that the 
understanding is required for perceptual consciousness: the perceptual 
presentation of particulars can take place in the absence of concepts, but 
we require the understanding in order to cognize them in a certain way. 
On this view, the involvement of the understanding may still be required 
for us to engage in a certain sort of thought about objects but it is not 
required for the perceptual presentation of particulars. 
How should we decide between these readings? A multitude of 
considerations have been raised by parties on both sides of this debate and 
I do not have space to consider them all here. But it will be useful to begin 
by summarising some of the reasons given for rejecting the weak reading’s 
claim that the understanding is not necessarily involved in our being 
perceptually presented with outer particulars.25 
The falsity of the weak reading is sometimes motivated by appeal to the 
opening paragraphs of the Transcendental Logic in which Kant 
distinguishes sensibility from the understanding and notes their 
interrelation (A50-52/B74-76). But this will not suffice. Kant’s claim in 
these passages is only that the unification of sensibility and the 
understanding is required for cognition [Erkenntnis] (A51/B76), and this 
falls importantly short of claiming that their co-operation is required for 
perception itself. 
One might attempt to draw a link from these passages to perception by 
noting that Kant held experience [Erfahrung] to be ‘a kind of cognition 
requiring the understanding’ (Bxvii), for if the understanding is active in 
cognition, and if experience is a kind of cognition, then the understanding 
is active in experience. But Kant’s use of the term ‘experience’ is not 
continuous with that of contemporary philosophers of perception and it is 
open for non-conceptualists to hold that at least some of Kant’s uses of the 
term pick out a form of judgement made on the basis of perceptual 
experience rather than the experience itself (e.g., B166, A176/B218, 
A189/B234). On this reading, those passages in which Kant claims that 
Erfahrung requires the active, combinatorial input of the understanding 
(A93/B126) show only that the understanding is required for a certain sort 
 
25 I provide a more detailed discussion of the debate in (Gomes 2014) from which some 
of the following is drawn. 
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of empirical judgement or thought. There is nothing thus far which 
motivates the involvement of the understanding in perception. 
It is for this reason that the debate between weak readings and their 
opponents has largely focused on whether the understanding is active in 
intuition [Anschauung]. In contrast to his use of term ‘Erfahrung’, Kant 
tells us explicitly that visual perception is a form of objective empirical 
intuition (An 7:154; cf. Prol. 4:283) and that empirical intuition is the 
means by which we are perceptually presented with objects (A180/B222; 
Prol. 4:283). Thus if the understanding is essentially involved in 
Anschauung itself, this would seem to tell against the weak claim since it 
would show that the discursive activity of the understanding is involved in 
the very perception of distinct particulars. 
There are two prominent reasons why commentators have thought that 
Kant held the understanding to be involved in intuition: his account of the 
role synthesis plays in the representation of intuitions and his aims in the 
Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. Let me summarise these 
considerations briefly.26  
The central points on synthesis were discussed above. Kant takes 
perception to involve acts of synthesis, ones in which the manifold of 
intuition, given to us through sensibility, is taken up and combined 
through an act of the understanding. This act of the understanding – one 
in which ‘the understanding determines the sensibility’ (B160n.) – confers 
a unity on the manifold of intuition. It does so by combining the manifold 
of intuition in accordance with the a priori rules which govern synthesis. 
These rules are the categories. ‘Consequently all synthesis, through which 
even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the categories…’ 
(B161). The understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual 
consciousness in virtue of the perceptual presentation of particulars 
requiring an act of synthesis which combines the manifold of intuition in 
accordance with the categories. 
Second, on the Deduction, Kant’s stated aim in the Transcendental 
Deduction is to show that ‘without their [the categories’] presupposition 
nothing is possible as object of experience’ (A93/B125) for ‘the objective 
 
26 I discuss these issues at greater length in (Gomes 2014), arguing that weak readings 
cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction’s role in answering Humean 
scepticism about our justified use of a priori concepts. 
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validity of the categories, as a priori concepts, rests on the fact that through 
them alone is experience possible’ (A93/B126). His argument in support 
of this conclusion turns on the necessity of combining the manifold of 
intuition. Since ‘the combination of the manifold in general can never 
come to us through the senses’ (B129), Kant argues that it must be the 
understanding, through the use of a priori concepts, which brings 
representations under the original synthetic unity of apperception required 
for combination. The conclusion is that ‘the manifold in a given intuition 
also necessarily stands under the categories’ (B143).27 
These considerations have been challenged and disputed by those who 
advocate a weak reading. I will not assess their responses here. For our 
purposes it is enough to note the prima facie textual evidence for taking 
Kant to hold that the understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual 
consciousness, contrary to the weak reading. 
Do these considerations motivate the strong reading? In the final section of 
this paper I will return to the considerations noted above to see whether 
they can be met by a view which holds that the understanding is not 
constitutive of perceptual consciousness but is, nevertheless, necessarily 
involved in the perceptual consciousness of rational beings. For now I 
want to show that there is nothing which precludes a Kantian form of 
naïve realism from allowing the necessary involvement of the 
understanding in the perceptual consciousness of rational beings, contrary 
to the implication of the Oxford Realists. This is the task to which I turn 
in the next section. 
4. Unification 
Let us return to Oxford Realism. Prichard’s opposition to Kant’s account 
of perceptual experience centres on an assumption about the character of 
perceptual consciousness: that it either involves a primitive relation of 
apprehension; or it involves a synthesis of sensory elements in accordance 
with concepts. Part of what is valuable about Prichard’s discussion is that 
he teases out the way in which these options are distinct: the primitive 
relation of apprehension which characterises naïve realism is 
 
27 Note that these considerations motivate ascribing to Kant the specific claim that 
certain a priori concepts – the categories – are essentially involved in perceptual 
consciousness. In what follows I will take it that the understanding is necessarily involved 
in perceptual consciousness for Kant through the activation of categorial concepts 
specifically. 
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fundamentally different in kind to the state with categorial content which 
arises from Kant’s synthesis of sensory elements. And since they are 
fundamentally different, any aspect of phenomenal character which is 
explained by relations of apprehension cannot involve the synthesis of 
sensory elements in accordance with concepts. But, given this insight, why 
should we accept that there is no more to perceptual consciousness than 
primitive relations of apprehension? In short: why can perceptual 
consciousness not have both aspects? 
This question is raised with particular force by Prichard’s successor at 
Trinity College, H.H. Price, in his 1932 book Perception. Price was an 
undergraduate in Oxford and a post-graduate in Cambridge, and his book 
bears the imprint both of Cook Wilson’s Oxford Realism and the 
Cambridge tradition of G.E. Moore and C.D. Broad. In Perception Price 
defends a sense-datum theory of perception according to which sensory 
experience involves being aware of a ‘given’ object of experience, which 
Price terms a ‘sense-datum’ (1932, p.3). This involves one important point 
of contact with and one important divergence from the naïve realism 
endorsed by Prichard. The point of contact is that both share an 
understanding of perceptual experience as involving a primitive and non-
conceptual relation of sensory apprehension: in the terminology of §2, 
both views endorse relational theories of perception. The divergence is that 
Price, in common with Moore and Broad, takes the domain of this 
relation to be wider than that of mere perception: all sense experience, 
including illusions and hallucinations, involves the sensory apprehension 
of an object of experience. Perception cannot be, then, a relation to 
ordinary, empirical objects. 
For our purposes, what is important about Price’s discussion is that he 
combines this relational account of sensory apprehension with a 
conceptual aspect to perceptual consciousness. Perceptual acceptance – the 
most basic form of perceptual consciousness (p.139) – has two elements: 
the sensory apprehension of a non-physical sense-datum and the being 
under an impression that things are a certain way. This latter element, 
which Price borrows from Cook Wilson (p.140) is a representational state 
in which the subject takes for granted that things are a certain way. It is 
part of perceptual consciousness proper, and not simply a postliminary 
judgement based on the sensory acquaintance (p.140-1): when one 
perceives a tree, one is acquainted with a non-physical sense-datum and 
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under the impression that it is a tree. ‘The sense-datum is presented to us, 
and the tree dawns on us, all in one moment’ (p.141). 
On Price’s account, perceptual consciousness thus has two elements: a 
relational aspect of sensory apprehension, the objects of which are 
particulars; and an intentional aspect of taking for granted that things are a 
certain way, the object of which is a proposition. Taking for granted that 
things are a certain way does not involve judging that things are that way – 
it is pseudo-intuitive rather than discursive (p.150) – but the content 
which one takes for granted is of a sort to feature in judgement (p.167). 
Thus perceptual consciousness involves both a non-conceptual relation to 
non-physical particulars and the conceptual representation of things as 
being a particular way. Contrary to Prichard’s assumption, perception has 
both relational and representational aspects.28 
Price’s one-time student, Wilfrid Sellars, follows him in endorsing a dual 
component theory of perception, one which is explicitly Kantian in 
motivation and form (1956, 1968, 1978). According to Sellars, perceptual 
consciousness has two aspects: an intentional aspect of taking things to be 
a certain way and a sensory aspect of sensing. The former draws on the 
conceptual capacities of the subject whereas the latter is wholly non-
conceptual. And whilst there is some dispute amongst readers of Sellars as 
to how we are to understand this sensory component, at the least it seems 
clear that whereas Price took the sensory component to consist of a 
primitive relation of apprehension to sense-data, Sellars takes it to involve 
some sort of sensory modification of the subject. The aim of Sellars’s dual 
component account is to respect Kant’s distinction between sensibility and 
the understanding whilst showing how the latter can be necessarily 
involved in the perceptual consciousness of rational beings. The result is a 
self-consciously Kantian version of a dual component theory. 
The key challenge for such theories is to explain how the two components 
of perceptual consciousness relate to each other such that we have one 
unitary, though complex, perceptual state. Sellars takes the relation 
between the two components to be causal (1963, pp.90-91) but this raises 
a question about whether the intentional component is really part of 
 
28 It is unclear to me whether Price takes both of these elements to contribute towards 
the phenomenal character of perceptual consciousness. If he does, then he should be 
classified as a weak relational theorist in the terminology of §2. If not, his account is close 
to the one I offer below. 
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perceptual consciousness proper. Price denies that the non-conceptual 
component is temporally prior to the intentional component (1932, 
pp.150-151) but doesn’t explain what binds them together in perceptual 
consciousness. This is a topic that any dual component theory will need to 
address. 
Nevertheless, we have a model for making naïve realism compatible with 
the involvement of the understanding in perceptual consciousness. We 
need recognise, with Price and Sellars but contra Prichard, that perceptual 
consciousness can have both relational and representational aspects. But 
instead of taking the non-conceptual aspect of perceptual consciousness to 
be a relation to sense-data, as in Price, or mere sensory modification of the 
subject, as in Sellars, we need insist that the phenomenal properties of 
perceptual consciousness are constituted by relations of apprehension to 
ordinary empirical objects. The result would be a naïve realist account of 
visual experience in Kantian phrase: visual perception involves a primitive 
relation of apprehension which determines the phenomenal character of 
the visual experience and intentional content which represents empirical 
particulars as falling under the categories. 
Price himself hints at just such a Kantian position, noting that perceptual 
consciousness would involve, on his view, concepts ‘which are not 
exemplified in the intuited data at all and cannot be abstracted from them 
- namely those concepts which make up the notion of ‘material 
thinghood’’ (Price 1932, pp.168-9). By replacing Price’s sense-data with 
the ordinary, empirical particulars of Prichard’s discussion, we have the 
outlines for a Kantian form of naïve realism on which one is immediately 
related to empirical particulars and under the impression that they are 
subject to categorial concepts. The rest of this section expands on this 
suggestion. 
The picture I will suggest looks as follows: Kantian intuitions are non-
conceptual apprehensions of empirical particulars, distinct from ourselves 
and situated about us in space. These relations alone determine the 
phenomenal character of visual experience: hence naïve realism. But when 
one stands in such a relation to empirical particulars, the manifold of 
intuition is synthesised in accordance with the categories in a process 
governed by the understanding. The result is a representational state which 
represents empirical particulars as subject to the categories. This 
representational state is not itself an intuition; it is the representation of an 
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intuition and its representational properties are not among the 
phenomenal properties of the visual experience. But the obtaining of the 
state bears a necessary connection to the presence of the intuition: a 
representational state with this content obtains in virtue of a subject with a 
discursive intellect standing in an intuitive relation of this kind. The 
understanding is thus necessarily involved in perceptual consciousness, not 
through constituting the intuition itself, but through the presence of a 
representational state which obtains whenever a discursive intellect intuits 
empirical particulars in a certain way.29 
On this account, visual experience has two elements: intuitions which 
determine the phenomenal properties of visual perceptions and a 
representational state which obtains partially in virtue of those intuitions. 
We can mark these two aspects as follows: when a subject S visually 
perceives an ordinary empirical object E, 
(1) S intuits E, and 
(2) It seems to S as if she intuits E. 
 
The relation in (1) is a non-conceptual relation of apprehension; the 
representational state in (2) is the outcome of a process of synthesis and it 
represents E as subject to the categories. The two components are related: 
the representational state in (2) obtains in virtue of a subject with a 
discursive intellect standing in the non-conceptual relation of 
apprehension. 
Let me expand on these claims in turn: 
(1) Intuitions are non-conceptual apprehensions of empirical particulars: this 
claim secures the naïve realist account of sensibility motivated in §3. It 
provides a straight-forward reading of Kant’s claim that intuitions relate us 
to objects singularly and immediately. Intuitions are singular because they 
are relations to particulars (A320/B377) and immediate because they 
present us with the particular directly (cf. Brewer 2006, pp.172-3). This 
explains why ‘all thought . . . must ultimately be related to intuitions, thus, 
 
29 This way of thinking about the phenomenal character of perception draws on Matthew 
Soteriou’s ‘Content and the Stream of Consciousness’ (2007) and, in particular, his 
account of how mental processes relate to mental states; see his (2013) for further 
development and detail. 
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in our case, to sensibility, since there is no other way in which objects can 
be given to us’ (A19/B33): intuitions are non-conceptual apprehensions of 
empirical particulars which give us objects in such a way that they can be 
the objects of thought. 
(2) When one stands in such a relation to empirical particulars, the manifold 
of intuition is synthesised in accordance with the categories in a process 
governed by the understanding: although intuitions are non-conceptual, they 
still have structure. This is how they differ from sensations: non-
intentional, modifications of a subject’s consciousness (A320/B376). The 
matter of empirical intuition – its manifold – is sensation; its form is 
space, the pure form of outer intuition. It is the matter of intuition – 
sensation – which is open to synthesis by the imagination in accordance 
with the categories. 
(3) The result is a representational state which represents empirical particulars 
as subject to the categories: the synthesis of the manifold of intuition is a rule 
governed process, guided by the understanding. As outlined in §§15-19 of 
the B Deduction, the role of this synthesis is to take the sensory elements 
which are given to us in sensibility and bring them under the unity of 
apperception. In order to so bring them, they need be synthesised in 
accordance with the a priori rules of combination. The result is a 
representational state which represents the world as a world of persisting 
unities, subject to causal relations. 
Since this synthesis is governed by the a priori rules of combination, the 
only concepts which are guaranteed to feature in the representational state 
are the a priori concepts which characterise the perceived particular. The 
fact that the intuitive apprehension of the particular can be characterised 
by certain empirical concepts makes available the possibility of those 
concepts featuring in the representational state, perhaps through rules of 
association understood as operating in a largely Humean manner. But the 
involvement of empirical concepts is not a necessary feature of the state.  
(4) This representational state is not itself an intuition; it is the representation 
of an intuition: Prichard’s claim is that those primitive relations of 
apprehension which constitute the character of perceptual consciousness 
cannot themselves be the outcome of a product of synthesis. This is 
because those primitive relations of apprehension relate us immediately to 
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objects without any input from the understanding whereas synthesis is 
undertaken by the understanding in accordance with concepts. It follows 
from this that the synthesis of the manifold of intuition cannot result in an 
intuition: synthesis results in a representational state with categorial 
content whilst intuitions are non-conceptual relations to particulars. 
One might think this to be a juncture at which this account is Kantian 
rather than Kant’s own, for Kant’s account of synthesis is often read as 
holding that the product of synthesis is an empirical intuition (Griffith 
2012, §5). I return to this issue in §5. For now it is enough to show that 
this Kantian form of naïve realism can allow that the necessary 
involvement of the understanding in our perceptual consciousness. 
Note, though, that this does involve an important departure from the 
account of perceptual consciousness offered by Price. In Price’s model, the 
intentional aspect to perception represents how things are in the world; its 
content concerns only the empirical particular and its perceived properties. 
In contrast, the representational state which results from synthesis is one 
which represents the intuition, i.e., the non-conceptual relation of 
apprehension which a subject stands in to the relevant empirical particular. 
Experience thus has an intentional content which also involves both the 
empirical particular and the subject of the experience: it seems to the 
subject as if she intuits the empirical particular. I will return to the reasons 
for this divergence in §5 below. 
(5) …and its representational properties are not among the phenomenal 
properties of the visual experience: since visual perception is a form of 
empirical intuition (An 7:154; Prol. 4:283), it is intuitions which 
determine the phenomenal character of visual experience. The 
representational state with categorial content which is the outcome of 
synthesis is not an intuition, so its properties are not amongst the 
phenomenal properties of visual experience.30 Nevertheless, there is a tight 
connection, to be outlined below, between the intuitions which determine 
the phenomenal properties of visual experience and the representational 
state which arises through categorial synthesis of the manifold of intuition. 
When a subject with a discursive intellect has an experience of a certain 
sort – when she has intuitions of kind I – she stands in representational 
 
30 This is a requirement of strong naïve realism. Removing the restriction would result in 
a form of weak naïve realism. See §2 above. 
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state R as a result of the combinatory activity of the understanding. This 
connection is necessary. Since R obtains partially in virtue of I, one can 
specify the phenomenal character of the visual experience indirectly by 
highlighting state R, to which I has given rise. This means that a 
specification of the phenomenal character can appeal to state R despite it 
being I which determines that phenomenal character (cf. (Soteriou 2007, 
pp.557-559)). 
(6) …the obtaining of the state bears a necessary connection to the presence of 
the intuition: there is a necessary connection between the presence of an 
intuition in a subject with a discursive intellect and the obtaining of the 
relevant representational state. This connection is not causal: the presence 
of the intuition does not cause a process of synthesis which gives rise to the 
representational state. Rather, the representational state obtains in virtue of 
a subject with a discursive intellect standing in the intuitive relation. 
This relation of obtaining in virtue of is a distinctive relation of 
metaphysical dependence. It has been the subject of recent discussion in 
metaphysics with a number of metaphysicians arguing that we need make 
use of such a notion in formulating metaphysical disputes (Fine 2001; 
Rosen 2010). Some examples standardly used to illustrate this relation 
include the claims an act is pious because the gods love it; that the mental 
is nothing more than the physical; that legal facts are determined by the 
social facts. Matt Soteriou (2007, pp.551f), uses an example of Helen 
Steward’s (1997, p.72f) to illustrate the connection in question: the state 
of a body of liquid being at a certain temperature for an interval of time 
obtains in virtue of the motion of its molecules. In each case, the higher 
level item is grounded in the existence of the lower level item providing us 
with ‘a distinctive kind of metaphysical explanation, in which explanans 
and explanandum are connected, not through some sort of causal 
mechanism, but through some constitutive form of determination’ (Fine 
2012, p.37). 
Recent discussions have attempted to characterise the logical features of 
this relation. Two of these are relevant for our discussion. First, this 
grounding relation is stronger than a mere modal connection, since two 
items can necessarily covary without one holding in virtue of the other 
(Dancy 1981, pp.380-82; Fine 2012, p.38). It is for this reason that the 
relation needs distinguishing from mere supervenience. Second, the 
grounded item is not identical with its ground, nor is it any less real than 
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its ground: both ground and grounded exist, and the former obtains in 
virtue of the latter (Fine 2012, pp.38-39). Some will wonder whether there 
is any such relation – stronger than mere causation, stronger than 
necessary covariance, weaker than identity – which can do this work, but I 
will proceed as if the relation is unproblematic.31 
My claim is that the representation of the intuition obtains in virtue of the 
intuition being present in a subject with a discursive intellect. 32  The 
intuition is not identical to the representational state, because the intuition 
is a non-conceptual relation of apprehension whilst the representational 
state involves categorial concepts, and intuitions cannot be identical to or 
constitute conceptual states (JL 9:91). Rather the representation of the 
intuition obtains partially in virtue of the presence of that intuition for 
what it is to be in that representational state just is for the intuition to be 
present in a subject with a discursive intellect. The explanation of this 
dependence is that the manifold of intuition in necessarily subject to an 
act of categorial synthesis in order to bring the manifold under the unity of 
apperception. Since this synthesis is guided by the a priori rules of the 
understanding, the resultant representational state is one which makes use 
of categorial concepts. On this way of thinking about the mechanics of 
Kant’s theory of perceptual experience, the role of synthesis is to import 
the intuition into the content of the representational state whilst 
explaining why it must be that such states obtain whenever discursive 
intellects stand in intuitional relations. 
It is this relation of metaphysical dependence – this relation of obtaining in 
virtue of – which explains why the two elements should be classed as parts 
of one complex perceptual state. For the two elements are not merely 
 
31 This seems acceptable in a Kantian context since we plausibly need appeal to 
something like a grounding or in virtue of relation in order to characterise a number of 
Kant’s own views. Consider, for instance, his claim that real possibilities are grounded in 
how things are in actuality (OPA 2:77-79). For further discussion of the grounding 
relation see the papers in (Correia and Schnieder 2012). 
32 For the sake of convenience, let the grounding relation hold between facts, where the 
right hand side of the relation encompasses a plurality (Audi 2012, Rosen 2010). And let 
the use of square brackets pick out facts. Then we can state the claim as follows: [it seems 
to S as if she intuits E] is grounded in [S intuits E], [S has a discursive intellect]. If we 
further distinguish full grounding from partial grounding [Fine 2012, p.50], then [it seems 
to S as if she intuits E] is fully grounded in [S intuits E], [S has a discursive intellect]; and 
partially grounded in [S intuits E]. Since only full grounding suffices for metaphysical 
necessitation, only [S intuits E], [S has a discursive intellect] will necessitate [it seems to S 
as if she intuits E]. And since the grounding facts are only sufficient for the grounded 
fact, the proposal is neutral on the question of whether [it seems to S as if she intuits E] 
can obtain without [S intuits E], [S has a discursive intellect]. 
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causally connected, as in Sellars’s dual component theory, nor merely co-
present, as perhaps in Price. Rather, the intentional element is grounded in 
the relational element and the result is a complex episode of perceptual 
consciousness with both relational and intentional aspects. 
A final point. Note that this connection between the representational state 
and the intuition holds only for subjects with a discursive intellect. This 
allows the possibility of creatures who lack a faculty of understanding 
standing in intuitive relations to empirical particulars without the 
obtaining of a representational state involving categorial concepts. Some 
have suggested that there are grounds for holding that Kant thought of 
non-human animals in this way (Allais 2009, pp.406-407; McLear 2011). 
This proposal is compatible with such a view: non-human animals are 
perceptually related to empirical particulars in the environment despite 
lacking the capacity to represent such particulars as falling under concepts. 
As Kant puts it in his discussion of the different levels of cognition in his 
lectures on logic, ‘[a]nimals are acquainted with objects too, but they do 
not cognize them’ (JL 9:64-5; see also VL 24:846; FS 2:59) and this is 
precisely because they do not represent them as subject to concepts.33 
This model of visual experience combines a naïve realist account of the 
phenomenal character of visual experience with the necessary involvement 
of the understanding in perceptual consciousness. It thus provides an 
account of visual experience intermediate between the claims that the 
 
33 If non-human animal perception lacks a representational component, does that mean 
that animals lack the capacity to perceive things as being a certain way? Many think it 
plausible that animals not only see objects, but see them as having certain features (Burge 
2010, pp.34-42), and if explanation of this aspect of animal perception required the 
presence of a representational component, then this would seem to tell against the above 
suggestion. But this aspect of animal perception can be captured by the relational 
component to perceptual consciousness, without any appeal to a representational 
element, since the relata of the primitive relations of sensory apprehension which 
constitute perceptual consciousness include not only empirical objects but also their 
properties. An animal which apprehends the leaf and its particular colour sees the leaf as 
green. So the representational element to human perceptual consciousness isn’t required 
to explain the possibility of perceiving as. An interesting implication concerns the 
possibility of properties which we can’t be related to via sensory relations of 
apprehension but which nevertheless structure perceptual consciousness in such a way 
that we see things as having those properties. The possibility of seeing things as having 
these properties is only possible given the representational component to perceptual 
consciousness. This is important if one is sympathetic to the Kantian thought that we 
cannot intuit categorial properties, such as that of causality. For if we can see one thing as 
causing another, as Ducasse and Anscombe each claimed (Ducasse 1965; Anscombe 
1971) but cannot intuit causal relations, then the explanation of this will need to turn on 
the representational element to perception. Thanks to the Editor for raising these issues. 
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understanding is constitutive of perceptual consciousness and the claim 
that the understanding need not be involved in perceptual consciousness at 
all, doing justice to those strands of Kant’s thinking noted in §3 of this 
paper. But it also, I believe, provides a way of thinking about visual 
experience which is attractive in its own right: visual perception relates us 
immediately to empirical particulars through a non-conceptual mode of 
apprehension but, as beings with discursive intellects, this apprehension 
suffices for the presence of a content-bearing state which represents things 
as being a certain way. Contrary to the implications of Oxford Realism 
and non-conceptualist interpreters of Kant, naïve realism is compatible 
with the necessary involvement of the understanding in perceptual 
consciousness.34  
5. Cognition 
My aim in this paper has been to show that we can formulate a version of 
naïve realism in Kantian phrase. And this has involved showing the 
compatibility of naïve realism with the intermediate claim that the 
understanding is necessarily involved in the perceptual consciousness of 
rational beings. But one might think that Kant was committed to the 
stronger claim: that acts of the understanding are constitutive of perceptual 
consciousness. And nothing I have said has shown that naïve realism is 
compatible with that claim. This final section will consider this issue. 
I noted two reasons for thinking that Kant held the understanding to be 
involved in perceptual consciousness: his account of the role synthesis 
plays in the representation of intuitions and his aims in the Transcendental 
Deduction of the Categories. Do these considerations motivate the strong 
claim that the understanding is constitutive of perceptual consciousness or 
 
34 How does this proposal compare to that offered by McDowell? The most important 
difference is that whereas McDowell takes the intentional aspect of perception to be 
basic, the view offered here takes the primitive relations of apprehension to be basic, thus 
securing a form of strong naïve realism of the kind endorsed by the Oxford Realists. But 
it also differs from McDowell’s in the way in which it works out the intermediate claim. 
For McDowell, the understanding is constitutive of our perceptual consciousness alone 
but it shapes our perceptual consciousness in such a way that there is no highest common 
factor between rational and non-rational perceptual consciousness (McDowell 2011, 
pp.20-21, pp.54-57; Boyle 2012). The account offered here allows a highest common 
factor to rational and non-rational perceptual consciousness, namely the presence of 
primitive relations of apprehension. It can thus provide what McDowell’s and Boyle’s 
proposals lack: an answer to the question of what makes non-rational perceptual 
consciousness a form of perceptual engagement with the world. But see (Boyle 2012, 
pp.419-20) for an expression of suspicion as to whether this question relies on a mistaken 
assumption. 
39 
only the intermediate claim that the understanding is necessarily involved 
in the perceptual consciousness of rational beings? This textual question 
cannot be settled here. In what follows I present some preliminary 
considerations. 
On synthesis: many have thought Kant’s discussion of synthesis to commit 
him to the claim that the obtaining of an intuition constitutively depends 
on an act of synthesis, in particular the discussion of ‘the synthesis of 
apprehension in intuition’ at A98–9 and B160–1. And if all synthesis is 
undertaken by the understanding (B130) then the understanding is 
constitutively involved in perceptual consciousness contrary to the 
intermediate claim. In contrast, the account of visual experience I have set 
out above holds not that intuitions depend on acts of synthesis but that 
representations of intuitions depend on acts of synthesis. This makes the 
role of synthesis compatible with the intermediate claim but only, one 
might think, by departing from Kant’s texts. 
Clinton Tolley (2013, pp.122-124) has recently argued otherwise. 
According to Tolley, there is a distinction between the mere having of an 
intuition and the representation of an intuition as an intuition, and the 
passages noted above show only that acts of synthesis are required for the 
representation of an intuition as such. For example, when Kant claims that 
‘[e]very intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be 
represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the 
succession of impressions on one another…’ (A99, my italics), the claim is 
that synthesis is required for intuitions to be represented as such [als ein 
solches vorgestellt], not simply for them to be represented or presented 
[vorgestellt]. Similarly the requirement that the manifold of intuition be 
synthesised if it is ‘contained in one representation’ (A99) is compatible 
with it not being required for the existence of the intuition. This way of 
reading those passages makes the outcome of synthesis not an intuition but 
the representation of an intuition as on the model of visual experience 
proposed above. 
Tolley’s reading of these passages makes them compatible with a denial of 
the strong claim that the understanding is constitutive of perceptual 
consciousness. If it is to convince, we need consider all the passages which 
have been thought to show that intuitions constitutively depend on acts of 
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synthesis. I won’t undertake that task here.35 It is enough to note that there 
is a plausible reading of Kant’s claims about synthesis which takes them to 
support the intermediate claim without supporting the strong claim. And 
if that is right, then the account of visual experience I have offered can be 
made compatible with Kant’s text.36 
The issue of the Transcendental Deduction is more difficult. The 
requirement here is to make sense of Kant’s aim in the Deduction of 
justifying our use of certain a priori concepts. In order for Kant to 
accomplish this task, it is not enough for him to show that we must, of 
necessity, apply the categories to the objects of experience, for that is 
compatible with our application of the categories to such objects being 
mistaken. He needs to show, further, that the categories really must apply. 
Only so will Humean scepticism about our use of a priori concepts be 
neutralised.37 
The worry about the intermediate interpretation is that it can only show 
that we must necessarily apply the categories to the objects of experience. 
On the model of visual experience presented above, for instance, the 
understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual consciousness, but not 
in the generation of intuitions. This leaves open the possibility that 
although we necessarily experience objects as falling under the categories, 
that which is given to us in intuition does not fall under the categories. 
Were this possibility to hold, visual experience would systematically 
mislead us as to the categorial nature of objects in the world. And absent a 
way to rule out this possibility, one might think the Humean problem 
remains. 
This is an important concern and one which arises for all those who want 
to deny the strong constitutive claim (Gomes 2014). A number of options 
 
35 See (Tolley 2013, pp.122-124) for the full defence. 
36 Does Tolley’s reading of these passages make them compatible with the weak reading? 
For that to be the case, it needs to be made plausible that the representation of an 
intuition as such – that representation which results from synthesis – is just a judgement 
that things are a certain way. But certain passages in §26, discussed by Tolley (pp.123-4), 
suggest that the kind of representation in question is a form of ‘empirical consciousness’ 
or ‘perception’. I take these to suggest that acts of synthesis still result in something 
perceptual, even if they don’t result in intuitions, as on the intermediate view. 
37 See (Gomes 2010) for a reading of the Deduction in this vein, and (Gomes 2014) for 
an argument that defenders of the weak claim fail to make sense of the Deduction’s anti-
Humean aims. Kant’s criticism of  ‘preformation-system of pure reason’ views (B168) 
shows that the mere psychological necessity of applying the categories is not enough to 
justify our use of the categories. 
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are open in response. One is to deny that Kant needs anything more than 
the subjective necessity of applying the categories to answer Humean 
scepticism. A second is to agree that Kant wanted more than that, but hold 
that his strategy in the Deduction is inconsistent with his view of 
perceptual consciousness (Hanna 2011). A more palatable alternative 
would be to show that the intermediate claim can suffice for showing that 
the categories really must apply. 
This final option would require showing how there can be necessary 
dependence of the representational element of perceptual consciousness on 
the nature of the objects of perceptual consciousness without the 
understanding playing a constitutive role in intuition itself. Some passages 
might be thought to point in this direction. Tolley (2012, pp.123-6) 
points out that Kant draws a distinction between intuition [Anschauung] 
and perception [Wahrnehmung], where the latter involves the subject being 
conscious of what is given in intuition as a unity (A119-20, B160). And 
some of Kant’s phrasing suggests that he thought his solution in the 
Deduction requires only that the understanding be necessarily involved in 
perception, not that it be constitutive of intuition (e.g. ‘Consequently all 
synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands 
under the categories…’ (B161, my emphasis)). But there are other passages 
which seem to show elsewise – e.g., the footnote at B160 – and, regardless 
of the textual issue, we still require an explanation of how the Humean 
problem of justification can be answered without the understanding being 
constitutive of intuition.38 
 
38 What options are available? Proponents of the strong view often assume that it is only 
if acts of the understanding are constitutive of perceptual consciousness that whatever is 
given to us in perceptual consciousness will be such as to fall under the categories. The 
natural way to cash this out is in terms of existential dependence: if the objects of 
perceptual consciousness are existentially dependent on our faculty for cognising them, 
then the constitutive involvement of the understanding in perceptual consciousness will 
determine the necessary applicability of the categories to the objects of perceptual 
consciousness. But it is important to note that we don’t need the existential dependence 
of the objects of perceptual consciousness in order to secure the anti-Humean conclusion: 
the existential dependence of the categorial properties would suffice. If it were the case that 
an object’s instantiation of a categorial property depended on our faculty for cognizing 
that property, then this alone would show that the categories must apply to the objects of 
perceptual consciousness – even if the objects of perceptual consciousness didn’t so 
depend. And although Kant sometimes suggests that the objects of perceptual 
consciousness existentially depend on our faculty for cognizing them (e.g., at A126-8), 
there are other passages where he emphasises that it is not the existence of the objects of 
perceptual consciousness which depends on our faculties for cognising them but only 
that which we know of them a priori (Bxviii; Prol. 4:293). This points towards a way in 
which the intermediate view can respond to Humean scepticism. For if it can be shown 
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I won’t pursue these issues here. They turn on wider issues about the 
structure of the Transcendental Deduction and I take them to indicate that 
an onus remains on defenders of the intermediate approach to show how 
such views are compatible with Kant’s aims in the Transcendental 
Deduction – at least to the extent that those intermediate approaches are 
intended to be Kant’s own. But my aim was only to offer an account of 
visual experience which was Kantian. And are there grounds for thinking 
that the account I have offered is at least that? 
I noted at the start of this paper that it is common in contemporary ethics 
to distinguish between Kant’s ethics and Kantian ethics (O’Neill 1989, Part 
III; Wood 2008, ch.1.1). Kant’s ethics is ‘the theory that Kant himself put 
forward’ whilst Kantian ethics is ‘an ethical theory formulated in the basic 
spirit of Kant, drawing on and acknowledging a debt to what the author of 
the theory takes to be his insights in moral philosophy’ (Wood 2008, p.1). 
If the account of visual experience motivated in this paper is to constitute a 
Kantian approach to the philosophy of perception, it should similarly be 
formulated in the basic spirit of the first Critique, drawing on and 
acknowledging a debt to the insights of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Let 
me conclude by suggesting two ways in which the account I have offered 
does this.39 
The first concerns the distinction between sensibility and the 
understanding. This distinction lies at the heart of the first Critique: it 
forms the basis for Kant’s account of cognition and is central to his 
explanation of the source and limits of metaphysical knowledge. Kant took 
his predecessors to have misconstrued this distinction – he mentions Locke 
and Leibniz by name (A271/B327) – either by intellectualising 
appearances or by sensualizing the concepts of the understanding. In both 
cases, a difference of kind is misconstrued as a difference of degree. Kant’s 
insight is that the two faculties cannot exchange their functions and that 
 
that an object’s possessing categorial properties is constituted in part by subjects 
necessarily perceptually representing objects as having those properties, then the 
necessary involvement of the understanding in perceptual consciousness would go some 
way to showing the falsity of Humean scepticism. McDowell’s (1985) account of colours 
and values is one model for such a procedure. Thanks to a referee for pushing me to say 
more. 
39 A third consideration, which I won’t focus on, has it that visual experiences need have 
a conceptual element if they are to justify beliefs. This line of thought has been pushed 
most forcefully by John McDowell (1994, 1998) and he sometimes ascribes it to Kant. 
The account offered here accords with this consideration. 
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both are drawn upon in our cognizing the world. This forms the bedrock 
to Kant’s theoretical philosophy. 
The account of visual experience I have offered respects both parts of 
Kant’s insight: it recognises a fundamental distinction between our sensory 
capacity for perceptual apprehension and our intellectual capacity for 
conceptual representation and explains how both are combined in our 
perceptual engagement with the world. Moreover it does so without 
sacrificing the distinctness of one or other faculty: the difference between 
sensible intuition and intellectual representation remains one of kind and 
not degree. The unification of sensibility and the understanding in 
perceptual consciousness allows the sensory and intellectual to be 
combined in perception without assimilating one to the other. 
The second point of contact concerns the relation between consciousness 
and self-consciousness. Kant is often read as endorsing a close connection 
between these phenomena: for at least some aspects of our mental life, 
being conscious of something involves being aware that one is so conscious 
(A98; B131f; A350; A361-7; An 7:127-8; ML2 28:584). The account of 
visual experience offered here provides one way of making good this 
thought in the case of perceptual experience: visual perception involves 
both the relational apprehension of empirical particulars and the 
intentional representation of oneself apprehending the empirical particular. 
Consciousness of the world in perception thus involves self-conscious 
awareness of oneself consciously perceiving the world: perceptual 
consciousness is a form of self-consciousness (Rödl 2007; McDowell 
2011).40 
 
40 I have said that this way of thinking about visual experience is attractive, but one might 
object that the implication that perceptual consciousness is a form of self-consciousness 
is shown to be false by reflection on cases of immersed activity, such as that of the tennis 
player who reacts instinctively to the movements of his opponent. Cases of this sort have 
featured in the debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell over whether 
perceptual consciousness has an essentially first-personal character (Dreyfus 2013, pp.28-
30; cf. McDowell 2007, p.346). McDowell defends the claim (2013, pp.45-6), arguing that 
cases of immersed activity involve a subject knowing that she is acting in a particular way, 
and although a subject cannot express such knowledge without disrupting her immersed 
activity, the knowledge is already present to be expressed as evidenced by her capacity to 
give a rational explanation of her actions. Dan Zahavi and Uriah Kriegel take a similar 
line in their recent defence of the claim that all conscious experience involves self-
consciousness (Zahavi and Kriegel 2015, §4). If this line of response can be made 
plausible, then the account of visual experience offered above has resources on which to 
draw in accounting for cases of immersed activity. See the essays collected in (Schear 
2013) for further discussion of this issue. Thanks to the Editor for raising this question. 
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This illustrates the divergence of this Kantian model from that offered by 
Price. Price takes the representational element to perception to represent 
how things are in the world: its content concerns solely the empirical 
particular and its perceived properties. In contrast, the account I am 
offering takes the representational element to have a distinctive first-
personal content: it seems to the subject as if she is intuiting the empirical 
particular. This first-personal content to visual experience arises whenever 
discursive subjects stand in intuitive relations to empirical particulars: 
perceiving an empirical object ipso facto puts one into a state with first-
personal content. The result is a distinctively Kantian spin on visual 
experience: consciousness of the world in intuition involves self-
consciousness of oneself intuiting the world. This provides a second way in 
which this model of visual experience is formulated in the spirit of the first 
Critique. 
Let me conclude. My concern in this essay has been the reconciliation of 
two claims. First, that visual perception essentially involves a relation to 
empirical particulars. Second, that the understanding is necessarily 
involved in perceptual consciousness. English-speaking philosophers of 
perception at the start of the twentieth-century took these claims to be in 
opposition and correspondingly formulated their naïve realist account of 
perception in anti-Kantian terms. My aim has been to show that this was a 
mistake: naïve realism can be situated within a Kantian framework which 
marks a distinction between sensibility and the understanding and takes 
both to be involved in perceiving the world. The result is naïve realism in 
Kantian phrase.41  
 
41 Many people have helped me with this paper, including Ian Phillips, Rory Madden, 
Nick Jones, Lee Walters, Rob Watt, Oliver Rashbrook-Cooper, Thomas Land, John 
Callanan, Erasmus Mayr, Max Edwards, Bill Brewer, Andrew Roche and audiences in 
Cambridge, Oxford, Luxembourg and York. Special thanks is owed to Craig French and 
Andrew Stephenson for extensive comments and discussion. Colin McLear’s comments 
were incredibly helpful in revising the paper for publication, as were those of two 
anonymous referees and the then-Editor of MIND, Thomas Baldwin. 
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